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I. INTRODUCTION
It has become increasingly common in recent years for conservative 
Christian thinkers to describe cultural conflicts in terms of a battle between 
Christianity and what they call the “paganism” of secular liberals.1  This
way of framing things raises some troubling questions for Jewish readers,
even if we are not necessarily the intended audience for such polemics.  
* © 2019 Richard Schragger. Perre Bowen Professor of Law and Joseph C. Carter,
Jr. Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
** © 2019 Micah Schwartzman. Joseph W. Dorn Research Professor of Law,
University of Virginia School of Law.  For helpful comments and discussion, we thank 
Kimberly Ferzan, Fred Gedicks, Leslie Kendrick, Fred Schauer, Paul Stephan, Nelson Tebbe, 
Rip Verkerke, and participants of a conference hosted by the Institute for Law and 
Philosophy and the Institute for Law and Religion at the University of San Diego. 
 1.  See, e.g., R.R. RENO, RESURRECTING THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY 3–7 (2016); 
Adrian Vermeule, A Christian Strategy, 277 FIRST THINGS 41 (2017); Charles J. Caput, 
(Re)Building the Kingdom: Secularism, Christianity, and Cultural Renewal, PUB. DISCOURSE 
(May 15, 2017), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2017/05/19326/ [https://perma.cc/
K96Y-TLET] (reviewing RENO, supra).
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We cannot help but ask questions like: What is the role of Jews and of other 
religious minorities in these conflicts? How do Jews fit into the relevant 
categories of Christianity and paganism? And how would Jews be treated
in a society in which either Christianity or paganism prevails?
The idea that Western democratic societies face an existential choice
between Christianity and paganism belongs initially to T. S. Eliot.2 And 
Eliot had some answers to our questions. In his Page-Barbour Lectures,
delivered at the University of Virginia in 1933, Eliot argued that Christianity
in the West was under attack by what he called “Liberalism,” which elevated
the values of individuality and originality over the traditional morality of
the Church.3 He called for a return to religious orthodoxy in order to “re-
establish a vital connexion between the individual and the race; the struggle, 
in a word, against Liberalism.”4 Pursuing that struggle, Eliot made clear that
he associated Jews with the subversion of the cultural, racial, and religious 
conditions necessary for maintaining and developing a stable Christian
society. In the fight between secular liberalism and Christianity, the Jews 
were a decidedly negative influence, to be marginalized and contained.5 
In later work, Eliot continued his Christian attack on liberalism, while 
muting, though never renouncing, his anti-Semitism. In The Idea of a Christian 
Society, he claimed that Western democracies face a choice between accepting 
the “Idea of a Christian Society” or acquiescing in a culture of secular
liberalism, or “modern paganism,” as he called it.6 Indeed, he asserted that
England was steadily slouching toward such paganism, if it was not already
there.7  Eliot then made the case for a Christian society, which might tolerate
religious minorities or at least those that did not threaten its cultural and 
religious traditions.8 
Eliot’s two primary claims—that the West faces a choice between
Christianity and paganism and that it should choose Christianity—are now 
the subject of a most extensive, sophisticated, and sympathetic treatment in
Steven Smith’s book, Pagans and Christians in the City.9  Smith develops
and advances both of Eliot’s claims. He argues that our culture is riven 
by Christian and pagan forces. And over a wide range of social and political
2.  T.S. ELIOT, The Idea of a Christian Society, in CHRISTIANITY AND CULTURE 1,
10 (1949).
 3.  See generally T.S. ELIOT, AFTER STRANGE GODS: A PRIMER ON MODERN HERESY
(1934).
 4.  Id. at 48. 
 5.  See id. at 19–20. 
 6.  ELIOT, supra note 2, at 48.
 7.  See id. at 9–10. 
 8.  See id. at 37–41. 
 9.  See generally STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE 
WARS FROM THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC (2018). 
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controversies, he defends the view that a Christian society is normatively
preferable to a pagan one.10 
This claim should be disquieting to religious minorities, as well as to 
nondenominational believers and nonorthodox Christians in any given 
society. For Jews, in particular, the division of the world into Christian
and pagan has particular historical resonance, leading us to ask: What are 
Jews supposed to make of all this? Although Smith recognizes his intellectual 
debt to Eliot, he does not discuss Eliot’s anti-Semitism. And while Smith
mentions various Jewish thinkers throughout his work, he does not take
up the Jewish question directly: What is the place of the Jew in a Christian 
or, for that matter, a pagan city?  Is the Jew a Christian or a pagan? Can 
the Jew be both or neither? And which kind of society should a Jew prefer,
a Christian one or a pagan one? 
Here we focus on the place of the Jews in Smith’s schema in part because 
antiliberals throughout history have already done so. The “wandering” or 
“cosmopolitan” Jew has been attacked as a symbol of liberalism. We also
emphasize the category of the Jew—which includes all those believers
who do not fit in a world bifurcated between orthodox Christians and 
nonbelieving pagans—as a way to challenge the notion that society is faced 
with only two possible choices.
In what follows, we argue that Jews are neither Christians nor pagans.  
The contrast between these two categories is falsely presented.  The Jew, 
or at least a certain conception of the Jew in the American experience,
provides a powerful counter-example to the categories that Smith uses to 
construct his conception of a Christian society. But once the Jewish idea
becomes clear, it is possible to reframe the choice posed by Eliot and by
Smith.  The choice of society is not binary: Christian or pagan?  It is ternary: 
Christian or pagan or Jew?
II. ELIOT AND THE JEWS
For Jews, a message that we can be either Christians or pagans and that 
we have to choose is disconcerting, even if Smith defines “Christian”
ecumenically in terms of those who believe in a “transcendent God.”11 
Smith’s concept of the two cities is borrowed from Eliot,12 so perhaps we 
10. Id. at 377–79. 
11.  Id. at 111–13, 126. 
12. Id. at 12–16. 
499
SCHRAGGER SCHWARTZMAN FINAL TO PRINT (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/2019 2:51 PM       
 
 









     
      
 
   
  
         
 
   
  
   
   
  
    
  




     






       
  
  
       
  
 
should start there, with Eliot’s conception of the place of the Jews in an
otherwise pitched battle between Christianity and paganism.
The view from Eliot is not reassuring. The Idea of a Christian Society, 
from which Smith derives his grand clash of civilizations, is a critique of
creeping paganism and an account of a Christian state.13 Eliot explicitly
calls for the “Christianisation of England” through the Anglican Church, 
which will have a “hierarchical organisation in direct and official relation
to the State” and “an organisation, such as the parochial system, in direct 
contact with the smallest units of the community and their individual 
members.”14 Eliot’s Christian establishment is intended to reflect, support, 
and direct a Christian society. The alternative is to “merely sink into apathetic
decline” or become a “totalitarian democracy.”15  To those “repelled by[] 
such a prospect, one can assert that the only possibility of control and balance 
is a religious control and balance; that the only hopeful course for a society 
which would thrive and continue its creative activity in the arts of civilisation, 
is to become Christian.”16 
Eliot’s use of “Christian” is not ecumenical. He does admit at one point 
that “there will be room for a proportion of other persons professing other 
faiths than Christianity,”17 but only those who bring special talents required 
by the state. Although Eliot makes clear that he is not advocating “the forcible 
suppression, or the complete disappearance of dissident sects,” he observes
that a Christian society “can only be realised when the great majority of the 
sheep belong to one fold” and that “dissentients must remain marginal.”18 
A Christian commonwealth is not one in which everyone is necessarily a
devout Christian, but it is “a religious-social community, a society with a
political philosophy founded upon the Christian faith” and “[t]he national 
faith must have an official recognition by the State.”19 
What about the Jews? Eliot’s views are by now well-known. He did not 
hide his anti-Semitism, either in his poetry or prose.20 What is important 
13. See ELIOT, supra note 2, at 20. 
14. Id. at 37–38. 
15. Id. at 18. 
16. Id. at 18–19. 
17. Id. at 29. Eliot makes this comment in the context of describing who can be part of 
the educational system in a Christian society, but as the remaining notes in the paragraph above 
make clear, he favored the marginalization and exclusion of non-Christians more generally. 
18. Id. at 36–37. 
19. Id. at 40–41. 
20. See, e.g., ANTHONY JULIUS, T.S. ELIOT, ANTI-SEMITISM, AND LITERARY FORM
32–40 (Thames & Hudson Ltd. rev. ed. 2003) (1995); CHRISTOPHER RICKS, T.S. ELIOT 
AND PREJUDICE 28 (1988); Walter A. Strauss, The Merchant of Venom? T.S. Eliot and 
Anti-Semitism, 14 S. CENT. REV. 31, 32 (1997); Louis Menand, Eliot and the Jews, N.Y. 
REV. BOOKS (June 6, 1996), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1996/06/06/eliot-and-the-
jews/ [http://perma.cc/UGA5-AFV8] (reviewing JULIUS, supra). 
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for our purposes is the relationship between Eliot’s views on Jews and his
attack on liberalism. For Eliot, paganism is Liberalism (with a capital “L”).21 
And in the anti-Semitic milieu in which Eliot wrote, liberalism was directly 
associated with the Jew.22 
Consider After Strange Gods,23 which set the stage for The Idea of a
Christian Society.24 Presented to a segregated audience at the University 
of Virginia, the lectures were a paean to traditional Christian morality—a 
disquisition on the necessity of a common religious culture.25 Eliot praised
the Southern Agrarians,26 a reactionary literary movement that defended
the agrarian virtues and genteel traditions of the Old South, shrouding its 
racial brutality in the Lost Cause of the Confederacy.27 
Eliot felt welcome in Virginia, which could still recall some semblance
of a “tradition” and was less affected by the “influx of foreign populations” 
that diluted and corrupted the Anglo-Saxon majority in the North.28  “You
are farther away from New York; you have been less industrialised and less 
invaded by foreign races; and you have more opulent soil.”29 Eliot embraced 
racial purity at the moment Hitler came to power and when the Jews of Europe
were in most need of protection.30 Oblivious to events unfolding across 
the Atlantic and comfortable in the midst of Jim Crow, he proceeded to explain
the conditions for developing a Christian tradition:
The population should be homogeneous; where two or more cultures exist in the
same place they are likely either to be fiercely self-conscious or both to become 
adulterate. What is still more important is unity of religious background; and reasons
of race and religion combine to make any large number of free-thinking Jews 
undesirable.31 
21. See ELIOT, supra note 2, at 11–13. 
22. See Strauss, supra note 20, at 36.
23. ELIOT, supra note 3. 
24. ELIOT, supra note 2. 
25. See ELIOT, supra note 3, at 19–21. 
26. See id. at 15–16. 
27. See generally  PAUL V. MURPHY, THE REBUKE OF HISTORY: THE SOUTHERN 
AGRARIANS AND AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT (2001); THE MYTH OF THE LOST 
CAUSE AND CIVIL WAR HISTORY (Gary W. Gallagher & Alan T. Nolan eds., 2000). 
28. ELIOT, supra note 3, at 15.
29. Id. at 17. 
30. See JULIUS, supra note 20, at 163. 
31. ELIOT, supra note 3, at 20 (footnote omitted).
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The reactionary sensibility in these sentences is expressed so compactly 
that it is possible to miss what is happening here. Eliot is arguing that a
political community must be unified in terms of culture, race, and religion.  
The Jews are anathema to this form of unity because they introduce a foreign 
presence that is racially distinct and religiously heterodox. The implication 
is that where there are too many “free-thinking Jews,” it will not be possible 
to sustain a Christian society.32 
Eliot’s anti-Semitic comments in After Strange Gods were condemned 
by some of his contemporaries.33  It is notable that Eliot did not allow the
lectures to be republished, although he also never repudiated his statements.34 
Defenders of Eliot have asserted that “free-thinking Jews” should not be 
read as a condemnation of Jews, but rather as a criticism of “secular humanism,” 
or liberalism, or paganism—practiced by whatever religious or ethnic group.35 
In Eliot’s case, however, this saving construction is belied by his embrace 
of standard racialized images of the Jew elsewhere: “And the jew squats 
32. See RICKS, supra note 20, at 50. 
33. See JULIUS, supra note 20, at 150; Francis Phillips, The Poet Who Confronted
T S Eliot over His Anti-Semitism, CATH. HERALD (Oct. 3, 2011), http://catholicherald.co.uk/
commentandblogs/2011/10/03/the-poet-who-confronted-t-s-eliot-over-his-anti-semitism/
[https://perma.cc/V7T4-FN9K]. 
34. See RICKS, supra note 20, at 47. 
35. See, e.g., Russell Kirk, T.S. Eliot on Literary Morals, TOUCHSTONE (1991), 
http://touchstonemag.com/archives/article.php?id=04-03-023-v [http://perma.cc/U9SY-WCLR] 
(reviewing ELIOT, supra note 3). In private correspondence, Eliot purported to defend himself
along these lines against the accusation of anti-Semitism.  He wrote: 
By free-thinking Jews I mean Jews who have given up the practice and belief of their
own religion, without having become Christians or attached themselves to
any other dogmatic religion. It should be obvious that I think a large number of free-
thinkers of any race to be undesirable, and the free-thinking Jews are only a special
case.
RICKS, supra note 20, at 44 (quoting Correspondence from T.S. Eliot to J.V. Healy (May 10,
1940) (on file with Harry Ranson Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at
Austin)). Why a special case? Eliot continued:
The Jewish religion is unfortunately not a very portable one, and shorn of its 
traditional practices . . . it tends to become a mild and colourless form of 
Unitarianism.  The free-thinking European, or American of European race, 
retains for the most part a good many of the moral habits and conventions of 
Christianity. . . . The Jew who is separated from his religious faith  is  much more  
deracinated thereby than the descendent of Christians, and it is this deracination that 
I think dangerous and tending to irresponsibility. 
Id. (quoting Correspondence from T.S. Eliot to J.V. Healy, supra). Apparently, Eliot’s 
defense is that Judaism does not wander well, and that free-thinking Jews are even more
threatening to Christian orthodoxy than their gentile counterparts.  We agree with Ricks
that Eliot’s response is “instinct with animus”—why single out the Jews as a special case? Id.
at 46. But then perhaps Eliot was right about the danger posed by free-thinking Jews, not
because, as Ricks observes, “the moral habits and conventions of Judaism are not retained by
free-thinking Jews, but [because] they strongly and even disconcertingly are.” Id. at 45.
We shall return to this point below in Part V.
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on the window sill” in his poem Gerontion,36 or the “jew is underneath the
lot” of “rats” in Burbank with a Baedeker: Bleistein with a Cigar.37  Other
examples abound.38 
The effort to separate the Jew from his liberalism fails for another reason. 
As Anthony Julius has well-described, the trope of the free-thinking Jew, 
and the association of the Jew with liberalism, was dominant throughout
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.39 Liberalism meant the rejection
of the religious state, recognition of rights of conscience, and, most of all, 
the political emancipation of the Jews. But for the dominant culture, the 
problem of the Jews was that they refused to recognize Christianity and
therefore also the Christian foundations of society and the state.  There was
no way to bring Jews into the fold. As Isaiah Berlin observed in describing this 
line of thinking: “[T]o tolerate them as an organised religion is a concession to
that liberalism and rationalism that constitutes a denial of what men are
for, to serve the true God.”40 
The “free-thinking Jew” sometimes appears as a distinct problem, independent 
from the pious or “devout” Jew. There is always concern with the secret
Jew—the assimilating Jew—appearing in European universities and government 
offices and asserting liberal nostrums. But as Julius notes, “Eliot cannot 
imagine Jews to be anything other than free-thinkers—liberals by another 
name.”41 Other writers made the relationship between Jews and liberalism
more explicit. Consider such assertions that “liberalism is nothing but 
secularised Judaism,” or “[e]very Jew is a liberal. He is a liberal by nature.”42 
To the Christian traditionalist, modern “Jews pose[d] a double challenge,
both to the primary need of culture for religion, and to the subsidiary need for 
36. T.S. ELIOT, Gerontion, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 21, l. 8, at 21 (1950). 
37. T.S. ELIOT, Burbank with a Baedeker: Bleistein with a Cigar, in THE COMPLETE 
POEMS AND PLAYS, supra note 36, at 23, ll. 22–23, at 24. 
38. See JULIUS, supra note 20, at 75–143; RICKS, supra note 20, at 25–76. 
39. See JULIUS, supra note 20, at 157–59. 
40. Id. at 159 (quoting ISAIAH BERLIN, THE MAGUS OF THE NORTH: J.G. HAMANN AND
THE ORIGINS OF MODERN IRRATIONALISM 126 (Henry Hardy ed., 1993)). 
41. Id. at 157. 
42. Id. at 158 (first quoting HUGO VALENTIN, ANTISEMITISM: HISTORICALLY AND
CRITICALLY EXAMINED 62 (A.G. Chater trans., Books for Libraries Press 1971) (1937); 
then quoting ERNST NOLTE, THREE FACES OF FASCISM: ACTION FRANÇAISE, ITALIAN 
FASCISM, NATIONAL SOCIALISM 70 (Leila Vennewitz trans., Mentor Publ’g Co. 1969) 
(1963)). 
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unity of religious background.”43 That is because modern Jews are “agents
both of secularism and heterodoxy.”44 
For Eliot, this makes the Jew particularly dangerous.  “[T]he scattering 
of the Jews amongst peoples holding the Christian Faith,” Eliot writes in 
Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, 
may have been unfortunate both for these peoples and for the Jews themselves, 
that the culture-contact between them has had to be within those neutral zones of
culture in which religion could be ignored: and the effect may have been to
strengthen the illusion that there can be culture without religion.45 
The idea that there can be cultural contact, and perhaps commonality, outside 
of religion is a falsehood of liberalism. There is no such possibility. For Eliot, 
there is a binary choice between Christianity and Jewish liberalism; there 
can be only one or the other—Christian or pagan—in either case, a religious
choice has to be made.
But whatever their choice, the Jews cannot win. Despised for being outside 
and apart from Christianity, but also attacked for seeking equal recognition
through assimilation, Jews are incompatible with a society grounded in a 
common faith and culture.  Eliot’s Jews are all problematic.  In his Christian 
society, free-thinking Jews must be limited and marginalized, while “devout”
Jews might have “culture-contact” with orthodox Christians, if only to 
reinforce their religious separateness and thus their cultural and political
ghettoization.46 
43. Id. at 165. 
44. Id. (“Jews appear to contribute to a culture without sharing that culture’s religion; 
they also have their own culture without benefit of adherence to Judaism.  Free-thinking, 
they are attached neither to the religion of their birth nor to any other religion.”). 
45. T.S. ELIOT, Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, in CHRISTIANITY AND CULTURE, 
supra note 2, at 79, 144 n.2. 
46. The passage from Eliot’s Notes quoted in the preceding paragraph, at id., appeared
in a footnote to the original edition published in 1948.  In 1962, Eliot revised this footnote to 
read: 
It seems to me highly desirable that there should be close culture-contact between 
devout and practicing Christians and devout and practising Jews. Much culture-
contact in the past has been within those neutral zones of culture in which religion 
can be ignored, and between Jews and Gentiles both more or less emancipated from
their religious traditions. The effect may have been to strengthen the illusion that
there can be culture without religion.
JULIUS, supra note 20, at 166–67 (quoting T.S. ELIOT, NOTES TOWARDS THE DEFINITION 
OF CULTURE 70 n.1 (2d ed. 1963) (1948)). For detailed comparisons of the original 
footnote with the revised version, see id. at 165–67. Julius argues that Eliot’s revision is 
“cryptically phrased” but does nothing to ultimately “advance at all on the exasperated 
anti-Semitism of After Strange Gods.” Id. at 166–67. We agree and would add only that 
Eliot’s apparent concession to “devout and practising” Jews is illusory. For Eliot, cultural
contact between orthodox Jews and Christians could only reveal their radical theological,
cultural, and political differences, reinforcing their separateness, except perhaps on the need to
condemn their free- thinking counterparts. After all, Eliot did not revise his statements that
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III. SMITH AND THE JEWS
We are not suggesting that anti-Semitism is necessarily part of a religious,
cultural, or political theory that assumes only two choices: Christian or 
pagan. Steven Smith is clear that his use of the term “Christians” includes
devout and practicing believers of all forms of transcendent religion and 
that his use of the term “pagan” includes all secularized persons regardless 
of their formal religious affiliation.47  And, of course, Smith does not partake 
of Eliot’s racialized imagery. 
We nevertheless want to make several points about the role that Jews
seem to play—or not to play—in Smith’s argument. Unlike Eliot, who 
condemned the Jews, Smith’s stark binary between Christians and pagans
instead erases Jews as having any distinct identity. There are Christian 
Jews, who affirm transcendent religiosity, and pagan Jews, who accept
immanent conceptions of value. Jews have no independent status; like 
everyone else, they are either Christians or pagans or on the way to becoming 
one or the other. 
Although Smith does not put things in this way, his theory describes two 
types of Jews: Good Jews and Bad Jews. The Good Jews are the “devout,”
the pious; resisters of paganism. Smith cites a series of Jewish thinkers— 
Abraham Joshua Heschel, Victor Frankl, and Jonathan Sacks—who seem 
to share his anti-pagan ethos.48 They emphasize God’s transcendence as
the source of moral and ethical value and divine consecration as giving
meaning and purpose to human life and to the natural world. By contrast,
the Bad Jews have been “emancipated from their religious traditions,”49 
to borrow Eliot’s phrase.  They are the assimilated, secularized, and paganized
Jews. Notably, Smith’s main examples of pagan thinkers—Ronald Dworkin
and Anthony Kronman—are or were assimilated, secular, and liberal or
progressive Jews.50 (Smith also cites Barbara Ehrenreich, who came from
a Scots-Irish, atheist family but married a secular Jew.)51  They reject
“dissentients must remain marginal, tending to make only marginal contributions,” and that
a Christian society “can only be realised when the great majority of the sheep belong to 
one fold.”  ELIOT, supra note 2, at 36–37. 
47. See SMITH, supra note 9, at 218, 248.
48. See generally id. ch. 2.
49. JULIUS, supra note 20, at 166 (quoting ELIOT, supra note 46, at 70 n.1). 
50. See SMITH, supra note 9, at 232–56. 
51. See id. at 240–41; Barbara Ehrenreich, HERS; Cultural Baggage, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Apr. 5, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/05/magazine/hers-cultural-baggage.html
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transcendent religion, including biblical ethical morals, in favor of non-
natural but immanent conceptions of the good.52 Their understandings of
sacred value are either subjectively given or perhaps objective but without
any independent, nonmoral foundation.
For all of these thinkers, however, their Jewish backgrounds or affiliations 
are irrelevant for Smith’s purposes. All that matters is that they line up 
on one side of his Christian-pagan divide or the other. This erasure of Jewish 
identity allows Smith to conscript these Jewish thinkers into his larger
conception of our culture wars, which focuses mainly on issues of sexual 
and religious freedom.53 
In this story, which Smith acknowledges is familiar from James Davison 
Hunter,54 “Christians” are traditional, conservative, or orthodox believers, 
who hold a certain constellation of normative views about sex and religious
liberty.55 Generally speaking, they believe that sexual relationships should
take place within marriage or not at all, and they believe the state should 
generally support transcendent religion, at least in noncoercive ways, and
should accommodate traditional believers except when there are extremely
weighty reasons to limit their freedom.56  These Christian views are opposed
by pagans, whose skepticism about transcendent religion leads to rejection
of traditional sexual mores and to opposition to state support for religion, 
including legal exemptions for religious believers.57 
Smith’s theory of the culture wars is admittedly not entirely novel, and
indeed some Jewish thinkers have made similar arguments. For example, 
more than two decades ago, Milton Himmelfarb wrote, “The trouble is not 
that religion in general has too small a role in American public life. The
trouble is that a particular religion has too great a role—paganism, the de 
facto established religion.”58 Himmelfarb then went on to attack liberalism:
[https://perma.cc/VF6Y-MJF2] (providing a brief autobiographical description of her ethnic 
background and life history). 
52. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013); BARBARA
EHRENREICH, LIVING WITH A WILD GOD: A NONBELIEVER’S SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH ABOUT 
EVERYTHING (2014); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A BORN-AGAIN PAGAN 
(2016).
53. See SMITH, supra note 9, ch. 10–11. 
54. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA (1991). 
55. SMITH, supra note 9, at 263–66. 
56. Id. at 282–84 (discussing sexual morality), 310–15 (discussing religious 
accommodations).
57. See id. at 286–89 (discussing opposition to traditional sexual morality), 315–18 
(discussing opposition to religious accommodations).
58. Milton Himmelfarb, in AMERICAN JEWS AND THE SEPARATIONIST FAITH: THE
NEW DEBATE ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE 65, 65 (David G. Dalin ed., 1993). 
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The Enlightenment’s project was liberal—to liberate us for the pursuit of our
happiness. But much of what began as liberal has turned libertine, and libertinism
has brought not liberation and happiness so much as enslavement and misery:
AIDS, kids who have kids, the absent father. First the French Revolution devoured
its children, then the Bolshevik Revolution, and now the sexual revolution.59 
Smith’s critique is notably similar to Himmelfarb’s, even if more elegantly 
stated. First, like Himmelfarb, Smith is preoccupied with pagan sexual 
mores. Smith gives considerable attention to the sexual proclivities of ancient
and modern pagans,60 presumably to make the larger point that Himmelfarb 
also makes—that sexual freedom is the product of a religious orientation 
and, more specifically, a degenerate one. Religion, and the culture it produces, 
does all the work of explaining social practices. Transcendent religion 
serves to develop and reinforce traditional social mores; immanent religion 
produces the opposite. There are no other causes. Little credit is given to
women’s economic and social liberation. Little blame is placed on an 
economic system that generates shocking levels of material inequality.61 
Paganism encompasses everything: AIDS, abortion, sex, drugs, and, most
recently, same-sex marriage.62 
Second, like Himmelfarb, Smith is waging a culture war, though Smith 
follows Eliot in framing his argument partly in diagnostic terms, as an effort 
to explain how we have arrived at the current cultural and political stand-
off.63 But what is the purpose of giving the social controversies of the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries the heft of an ancient struggle
between paganism and Christianity?  As he has done before, Smith seeks
to present the historical arc of Western cultural and political development
as a struggle for religious domination. He argues that modern liberalism 
is a “religion,” pursued with as much religious fervor as paganism was in
ancient Rome.64 Clearly this rhetorical trope has never gone out of fashion.
Eliot invokes it at mid-century; Himmelfarb, in the early 1990s. Religious 
conservatives in every era bemoan cultural decline, and they regularly place
59. Id. at 66. 
60. SMITH, supra note 9, at 71–78.
61. Although, here, contemporary conservatives may part ways with Eliot, who took 
a dimmer view of capitalist, industrial economies.  See ELIOT, supra note 2, at 48–49. 
62. See SMITH, supra note 9, at 282 (“[T]he struggle [is] over a variety of issues
connected in various ways with sexuality: contraception, pornography, abortion, homosexuality, 
same-sex marriage.”).
63. See id. at 8–11. 
64. Id. at 344. 
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such decline at the feet of an irreligious culture, presumably aided and abetted
by a too-emphatic constitutional emphasis on church-state separation.
It takes a certain chutzpah to suggest that the Supreme Court’s modern 
religious freedom jurisprudence, which is only about seventy-five years
old, is really an instantiation of a millennial battle for the soul of Western
civilization. But Smith has been dogged in his efforts to reorient the origins
of modern religious freedom to someplace other than the Enlightenment.  
Most recently, he has argued that the foundations of religious freedom lie
in the medieval doctrine of the freedom of the church, which established
a principle of deference to church sovereignty.65 In this book, he goes
back further still to ancient Rome.66 
In both these eras, the Jews are erased from the story—they have no
presence. Smith mentions Christian persecution of Jews in passing67 but
devotes little time to the depredations of the Inquisition, the Crusades, the
long history of forced conversions and expulsions, pogroms in every age, 
or the Holocaust.68  It would appear from his narration that the Christians
were more often persecuted than persecutors. Yet the history of Western
civilization is soaked with the blood of Jews, a tiny minority, and yet one 
of the most despised on earth. Smith’s account of the battle between
transcendent and immanent forms of religion cannot account for this hatred
or its history. Jews had nothing at all to do with paganism in ancient Rome 
or medieval Europe. It is only the Enlightenment and the rise of liberalism 
that brings the Jews some relief, and that relief is frankly short-lived.
So, too, in both ancient Rome and medieval Europe the existence of a
state religion was taken for granted, as was the absence of anything approaching
a moral or political principle of religious liberty. The medieval principle 
of freedom of the church was not a principle of religious liberty, but rather 
one of jurisdictional sovereignty.69 The Catholic Church did not embrace 
religious free exercise until the twentieth century.70 And why would it?
65. See Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church?, in LEGAL
RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ACCOMMODATION AND ITS 
LIMITS 249, 266–69 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012) [hereinafter Smith, Freedom of Religion]; 
Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Conception of Church Autonomy, in  THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 19, 29–31 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë 
Robinson eds., 2016) [hereinafter Smith, Jurisdictional Conception]. 
66. See SMITH, supra note 9, at 56–57.
67.  Id. at 206, 214–15. 
68. See Samuel C. Rickless, Paganism is Dead, Long Live Secularism, 56 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 451, app. at 482–84 (2019). 
69. Smith, Jurisdictional Conception, supra note 65, at 19. 
70. For a helpful overview of the Church’s position on religious freedom in the half-
century or so leading up to Vatican II, see Anna Su, Catholic Constitutionalism from the 
Americanist Controversy to Dignitatis Humanae, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1445, 1445–57 
(2016). 
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Either one’s religion is true or it isn’t—and if it is true, then there is good
reason to impose it even on an unwilling populace.71  As Smith explains,
the Romans thought this too, even if they sometimes tolerated minority
religions.72 Their state religion was pagan first, and then it was Christian.73 
Jews, historically, watched as state religions came and went. For them,
and despite Smith’s story, all too often the specifics of the regime could not 
have mattered less. Religious control of the state was never a possibility
for the Jews; indeed, it only brought misery and sorrow. As The Who sang,
“Meet the new boss. Same as the old boss.”74 
Smith’s advocacy of a Christian society, however, raises the obvious 
question of whether he ought, like Eliot, to favor a Christian state. In the 
battle of religious regimes—transcendent versus immanent—the former
is clearly superior to the latter. The pagans cannot account for life’s meaning.75 
Pagan existence is desiccated, sad, and impoverished. Christianity, in the 
broad, ecumenical sense, is necessary to give life meaning and purpose,
and acting on that purpose is presumably necessary for leading a good life.  
And so, at the very least, pagans should allow Christians free exercise of
religion. More profoundly, perhaps, we should all become Christians, and
following Eliot, we should all prefer to live in a Christian society.76 
Unlike Eliot, however, Smith does not endorse a Christian state,77 even 
if that seems like a natural extension of his argument. After all, why wouldn’t 
we favor a Christian commonwealth if it supports the moral and spiritual
goods that are so valuable to meaningful human existence? And why
wouldn’t we reject the various forms of paganism—and then why not also 
liberal Protestant or Enlightenment beliefs that slouch toward paganism—
that undermine those goods and, if possible, enlist the state’s power in support
of our efforts?
For Jews and other religious minorities these questions are disconcerting,
even if we are ostensibly included in a capacious “Christian” or, in the 
supercessionist phrase, “Judeo-Christian” society. Jews have for centuries 
been the targets of Christian reformist zeal. And when that has failed, we 
71. See Larry Alexander, Good God, Garvey! The Inevitability and Impossibility of a
Religious Justification of Free Exercise Exemptions, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 35, 41 (1998). 
72. See SMITH, supra note 9, at 154–55. 
73. See id. at 158–59. 
74. PETE TOWNSHEND, We Won’t Get Fooled Again, on WHO’S NEXT (Olympic Studios
1971).
75. See SMITH, supra note 9, at 370–77. 
76. See id. at 379 (quoting ELIOT, supra note 2, at 18–19). 
77. See id. at 378–79. 
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have been persecuted, ostracized, ghettoized, terrorized, and slaughtered.78 
And so Jews, especially in America, often adopt a different historical narrative,
not one in which pagans square off against Christians—as there is nothing
novel to Jews about murderous pagans, whether Roman or otherwise79— 
but one in which religion ceases to define our standing in the political
community. The Jews’ quest for emancipation and eventually for social
and political equality emerges as a commitment to what Eliot recognized 
as “political Liberalism.”80 Jews embrace liberalism not because they are
pagans but because, unlike any Christian politics they have known, it has 
guaranteed their free and equal citizenship.
IV. JEWS, EQUALITY, AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
There is a third Jew, neither Christian nor pagan. Remember that for Smith, 
the distinction between Christian and pagan is mainly creedal or doxastic.
Christians—in Smith’s ecumenical sense—believe in transcendent religion, 
with all the spiritual, moral, and political commitments that follow from 
that orientation to the world. If we focus on matters of religious freedom, 
Christians favor public recognition of belief in God and Christianity (or the
“Judeo-Christian” tradition), the inclusion of religious reasons as a basis
for political decision-making, government religious speech in the form 
of passive symbols and school prayer, and public funding of religious 
institutions.81 They also support religious accommodations out of deference
to transcendent authority, which may impose duties that take priority over 
those imposed by the state.82 
According to Smith’s story, pagans repudiate all of these commitments.  
They reject transcendent authority in favor of an immanent religion, in which
78. The literature documenting the history of anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism is 
depressingly vast. See, e.g., JAMES CARROLL, CONSTANTINE’S SWORD: THE CHURCH AND
THE JEWS: A HISTORY (2001); WALTER LAQUEUR, THE CHANGING FACE OF ANTISEMITISM:
FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY (2006); ROBERT S. WISTRICH, A LETHAL
OBSESSION: ANTI-SEMITISM FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE GLOBAL JIHAD (2010).
79. Nor must Jews rely on Christian morals to condemn pagan or Christian atrocities.
For the idea that modern critics of Christianity rely implicitly on Christian values, see SMITH, 
supra note 9, at 214–15. This claim seems to rest on a narrower conception of Christianity, 
rather than the broad ecumenical one that embraces all transcendent religion. But either way, 
Jewish values, including ideas about justice, were and remain perfectly sufficient for purposes
of condemning pagan and Christian atrocities. 
80. ELIOT, supra note 2, at 13. 
81. See SMITH, supra note 9, at 267–75 (discussing religious symbols); see also
Steven D. Smith, Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School 
Prayer Decisions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 945, 947 (2011). 
82. See SMITH, supra note 9, at 304–15. 
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the sources of normativity exist within this world, rather than beyond it.83 
And given their immanent orientation toward the world, they favor the de-
Christianization of the public sphere. They oppose civic religion in its
Christian forms.84 They reject reliance on religion as justifications for state 
policy.85 They oppose state-sponsored religious symbols and school prayer.86 
They take a skeptical view toward state funding of religious institutions,
especially schools, and they tend to oppose religious accommodations.87 
The difficulty for Smith is that the Jew does not fall easily within either 
of these categories. Jews are not pagans because they believe in a transcendent 
religious power.  Smith recognizes this fact about the Jews, although usually 
his discussion is limited to “devout” Jews.88 We are not entirely clear on 
what “devout” means here, but the suggestion seems to be that politically 
conservative, Orthodox Jews believe in transcendent religion, while 
politically liberal, Reform Jews are partly (or mostly?) pagan.  But this claim
is unsubstantiated and, even if Smith means to assert it, almost certainly
false.89 Even if many liberal Jews have assimilated and become secular, 
83. Id. at 111–12 (“Pagan religion locates the sacred within this world. . . . [I]t is 
religiosity relative to an immanent sacred.  Judaism and Christianity, by contrast, reflect a
transcendent religiosity; they placed the sacred, ultimately, outside the world . . . .”), 211 
(“[T]he pagan orientation . . . beatifies and sacralizes the goods of this world—that holds that
‘the sacred’ exists, and that it exists in this world and this life.”).
84. See id. at 367. 
85. See id. at 334–39. 
86. See id. at 267–82. 
87. See id. at 316–28. 
88.  Id. at 13, 248, 276. 
89. Indeed, many Reform Jews might be surprised and offended at the suggestion
that they are not “devout” in the sense that they do not accept belief in a transcendent God.
The Reform Jewish movement has always affirmed monotheism as a central tenet of belief.
This is clear from successive platforms adopted by the movement since the nineteenth century.
See MICHAEL A. MEYER & W. GUNTHER PLAUT, THE REFORM JUDAISM READER: NORTH
AMERICAN DOCUMENTS 195–212 (2001); see also SYLVAN D. SCHWARTZMAN, REFORM
JUDAISM IN THE MAKING 3–11 (Emanuel Gamoran ed., 2d ed. 1959) (1955) (discussing
Reform platforms from the nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century). According to 
the 1937 statement, “The heart of Judaism and its chief contribution to religion is the 
doctrine of the One, living God, who rules the world through law and love.” MEYER &
PLAUT, supra, at 200. The 1976 platform, the first since the Holocaust, declared that “[t]he
affirmation of God has always been essential to our people’s will to survive.” Id. at 205.  
And the movement’s most recent statement “affirms the central tenets of Judaism—God, 
Torah, and Israel—even as it acknowledges the diversity of Reform Jewish beliefs and
practices.” Id. at 208. With respect to belief in God, the 1999 platform proclaims “the reality 
and oneness of God, even as we may differ in our understanding of the Divine presence” 
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or pagan in Smith’s terms, many have and continue to affirm belief in 
God.90 
If Jews are not pagans, nor are they Christians in Smith’s sense, at least
not in the context of debates about religious freedom. For much of the 
past century, most American Jews—and here we are talking about millions 
of worshipping monotheists—have favored a separationist approach to 
church and state.91 They have sought precisely the de-Christianization of
the “public square” that Smith, and Eliot before him, decries.92  American
Jews generally have opposed state support of Christian symbols and prayer
in public schools.93  They have been vocal opponents of state funding for
religious schools.94 And they have argued public policy ought to be conducted
mainly in terms of public reasons.95  At the same time, while working to
roll back state support for Christianity, Jews have supported religious
and affirms “that the Jewish people is bound to God by an eternal . . . covenant, as reflected 
in our varied understandings of Creation, Revelation and Redemption.”  Id. at 209. 
90. According to recent polling by the Pew Research Center, approximately 76% 
of Reform Jews report that they believe in God, with 29% reporting such belief as “absolutely
certain” and 47% reporting “belie[f], but less certain.” LUIS LUGO ET AL., PEW RESEARCH
CTR., A PORTRAIT OF JEWISH AMERICANS: FINDINGS FROM A PEW RESEARCH CENTER SURVEY 
OF U.S. JEWS 74 (2013), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2013/10/
jewish-american-full-report-for-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8EB-QBSH]; see also ROBERT 
P. JONES & DANIEL COX, PUB. RELIGION RESEARCH INST., CHOSEN FOR WHAT? JEWISH
VALUES IN 2012: FINDINGS FROM THE 2012 JEWISH VALUES SURVEY 26 (2012), https://w 
ww.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Jewish-Values-Report.compressed.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Y5UH-Y3VL].
91. See generally NAOMI W. COHEN, JEWS IN CHRISTIAN AMERICA: THE PURSUIT OF
RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (1992); GREGG IVERS, TO BUILD A WALL: AMERICAN JEWS AND THE
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1995). In the last half-century especially, there
have been dissenting voices among Conservative and Orthodox Jews, who reject
separationism. See David G. Dalin, Jewish Critics of Strict Separationism, in JEWS AND THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE: DEBATING RELIGION AND REPUBLIC 291, 291–309 (Alan 
Mittleman, Robert Licht & Jonathan D. Sarna eds., 2002). For discussion of the significance 
(or lack thereof) of these conflicting views, see infra text accompanying notes 110–14. 
92. SMITH, supra note 9, at 275, 303 (“[Pagans] seek, in other words, to repudiate the
generically, implicitly Christian city that Americans have inherited—the one the Supreme
Court recognized when in 1892 it declared that ‘we are a Christian nation’ . . . .” (quoting
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 470–71 (1892))).
93. See, e.g., U.S. Jewish Groups Laud Supreme Court Ban on Prayers in Public 
Schools, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY 1 (June 27, 1962), https://www.jta.org/1962/06/
27/archive/u-s-jewish-groups-laud-supreme-court-ban-on-prayers-in-public-schools [https://
perma.cc/3KRC-J4W2].
94. See, e.g., American Jews and the Current Challenges of Church-State Separation, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 19, 2004, 10:00 AM), http://www.pewforum.org/2004/10/19/american- 
jews-and-the-current-challenges-of-church-state-separation/ [https://perma.cc/HS7U-MMEX]. 
95. See JONATHAN D. SARNA & DAVID G. DALIN, RELIGION AND STATE IN THE
AMERICAN JEWISH EXPERIENCE 172–74 (1997) (discussing Jewish opposition to “religious
legislation” in the late nineteenth century).
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accommodations, especially from laws that reflect the preferences of Christian 
majorities, as with Sunday closing laws and prohibitions on religious dress.96 
The Jew, like many in American society, whether formally affiliated
with a particular religion or not, is both a transcendent believer and
a separationist, and thus represents a problem for Smith’s diagnosis of the 
culture wars, especially with respect to religious freedom. Smith’s claim
is that the U.S. Constitution, including the First Amendment, is agnostic 
about religion. It does not favor Christianity over paganism or vice versa.97 
Instead, it provides a framework for politics within which Christians and
pagans can compete for influence. Christians can argue for subconstitutional 
laws that reflect their religious commitments through public expression of 
religious values, prayer in school, state support of religious institutions, 
and religious accommodations. And pagans can resist these efforts.  The
Constitution does not take sides. But according to Smith, sometime starting 
in the 1950s and 1960s, liberals and progressives moved aggressively to 
work a revolution in the meaning of the Constitution, converting it from 
a common set of religiously agnostic principles into a partisan sword used
to spread the pagan faith.  As he writes, their “struggle has not been to 
transform a Christian element into a pagan one, but rather to capture what
had previously been a more neutral framework . . . and turn it to the cause 
of secularism or immanent religion.”98 Of course, legal actors did not
advance their views in the name of paganism or immanent religion. They
argued on behalf of liberalism or secularism.  But, Smith contends, courts 
went along and “implicitly embraced, wittingly or unwittingly, a conception
of the political community formed in immanently religious terms.”99 
The Jews inconveniently contradict this story of pagan constitutional 
capture. It is true that American Jews sought to diminish state support for
Christianity, but their purpose was not to supplant Christianity with immanent 
religion. After all, those Jews who opposed Sunday closing laws, school 
prayer, and state support of religious schools were themselves believers in a 
transcendent God. Smith’s diagnosis of the culture wars simply cannot 
account for why Jews—and for that matter, mainline Protestants, liberal
96. See generally Michael A. Helfand, Jews and the Culture Wars: Consensus and
Dissensus in Jewish Religious Liberty Advocacy, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 305 (2019) (surveying
the history of various American Jewish organizations’ positions on religious accommodation). 
97. SMITH, supra note 9, at 266–67. 
98. Id. at 267
99. Id. at 278. 
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Catholics, or others100—would object to living in a “Christian” society.
His view cannot make sense of their purposes or why they believed that 
the Constitution warrants stronger protections for religious minorities.  
After all, if all religious believers are “Christians,” the only possible 
minorities are Christians or pagans.  There is no space for the idea that some
believers might reject a Christian society without accepting paganism. 
That, however, is precisely what the Jews did. And they did it openly, 
publicly—without mystery, secrecy, or any ulterior motive—and for a
straightforward reason, namely, to secure the legal conditions of their 
emancipation and equal citizenship. Consider, in this regard, the views of 
Leo Pfeffer, who was the son of an Orthodox rabbi, a practicing Jew, counsel 
for the American Jewish Congress for nearly three decades after World
War II, and the most influential church-state litigator and scholar of his 
generation.101 Pfeffer described himself as an “absolutist” about the separation 
of church and state.102 He interpreted the First Amendment’s religion clauses
as a unified guarantee of religious freedom, one that required “neutrality 
not only as among competing faiths, but between religion and non-religion.”103 
This principle of religious neutrality meant that the government could act 
only for secular purposes. Religious ends were not within the state’s
jurisdiction; they were a matter for private choice and voluntary association.104 
100. See  TED G. JELEN & CLYDE WILCOX, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD CHURCH AND 
STATE 94–95 (1995); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 282 (2001).
101. See Samuel Krislov, Alternatives to Separation of Church and State in Countries 
Outside the United States, in RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 421, 
421 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1985) (“No one comes to mind . . . to rival Pfeffer’s intellectual 
dominance over so vital an area of constitutional law for so extensive a period . . . .”);
Richard John Neuhaus, The Pfefferian Inversion, NAT’L REV., May 13, 1988, at 44, 44
(“Leo Pfeffer . . . has done more than anyone else to shape the law regarding religion and
state in America.”); Smith, supra note 81, at 950 (describing Pfeffer as “the most learned
and active separationist litigator-scholar of his time (and, arguably, ever)”).  Pfeffer was
counsel in numerous landmark cases involving the Religion Clauses, including Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); 
Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). For Pfeffer’s role in litigating these and other
cases, see Leo Pfeffer, An Autobiographical Sketch, in RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS 
IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER, supra, at 487, 487–533. Pfeffer’s major scholarly works 
include: CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (1953); GOD, CAESER, AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1975); and RELIGION, STATE AND THE BURGER COURT (1984).
102. Leo Pfeffer, The Establishment Clause: An Absolutist’s Defense, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 699, 700 (1990). 
103. Leo Pfeffer, State-Sponsored Prayer, 76 COMMONWEAL 417, 417 (1962). 
104. See Leo Pfeffer, Freedom and Separation: America’s Contribution to Civilization, 
2 J. CHURCH & STATE 100, 106–11 (1960). 
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Notably, in remarks addressed to an audience at Princeton Theological
Seminary, Pfeffer described his separationism as a “Jew’s approach” to 
church-state relations in the United States.105 Pfeffer claimed that “American
Judaism is perhaps the most vigorous, articulate, and unyielding champion of
that principle of separation of church and state and religious freedom.”106 
In explaining why Jews are so attached to separationism, Pfeffer pointed
to their experience of freedom and equality in America. He noted that 
although “nothing in ancient Jewish tradition . . . would indicate a sympathy 
either with separation of church and state or with religious freedom,” American
Jews “would be less than human, and we are not[,] . . . if we did not feel
a great debt of gratitude towards a system which, after almost two thousand 
years of persecution, has given us a real haven and a real equality.”107 
Following Pfeffer, we can say that a Jew’s approach to matters of 
religious freedom is motivated by the historical consciousness and long
experience of social and political exclusion. The initial acceptance of a 
principle of religious freedom may be instrumental, in service of attempts 
to gain social recognition and political equality. But over time, as successive
generations of Jews have grown up under governmental institutions that
treat them with equal respect, they have developed a moral commitment
to the constitutional principles that structure those institutions.
This is a story about why the Jews—or at least the majority of American 
Jews—have been strong supporters of the separation of church and state.
(It is not exclusively their story, of course. In the Founding generation, 
Baptists and other Christian minorities spearheaded disestablishment.108)
Jews are not pagans who have captured the Constitution or “weaponized” 
it in order to spread their immanent religious beliefs. Instead, they are a small
religious minority that has benefited tremendously from the rise of a secular
state, one in which religious status does not determine rights of citizenship 
or, more generally, a person’s life chances.
As Pfeffer put it, “American Jewry has finally achieved a position of
equality.”109 For those with a sense of history, that fact is a source of some 
amazement, perhaps a measure of pride, but also of understandable anxiety. 
105. Leo Pfeffer, Church and State, 53 PRINCETON SEMINARY BULL. 37, 38–39 (1959).
106.  Id. at 39. 
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA 
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 13 (1986); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 58, 60–61 (1986). 
109. Pfeffer, supra note 105, at 48. 
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As Jews have learned painfully over the last two millennia, the conditions
of emancipation and political equality can be reversed. There are many
threats.  Pagan assimilation may be one, as it may lull Jews into a false sense 
of security; romanticism for the resurrection of a Christian society may be 
another, as it invites anti-Semitism and the exclusion of non-Christian
minorities. 
There is, of course, disagreement among Jews about how to deal with 
these threats.110 Many American Jews continue to favor separationism. They 
see the risks of assimilation as less dangerous than the risks posed by a
state that supports the majority religion, which is invariably Christianity—
not Smith’s ecumenical version, but a rather more sectarian, if not full-
throated, conception. The result of greater state involvement with religion 
is, in Suzanna Sherry’s memorable phrase, “Jews lose.”111  A minority of
American Jews, however, take a different view.112 They favor state support
of religion, in part because they share Smith’s fear of a secular or pagan 
society more than they do social and political exclusion within a Christian
one. Himmelfarb’s is an extreme expression of this view, but it has more
learned and thoughtful supporters.113 
It should be clear, however, that the existence of Jewish opposition to
separationism does not undermine our claim, which is that most American
Jews are neither pagans nor Christians.  To sustain our argument, what matters 
is that the disagreement within American Jewry is taking place among
religious believers.  There are Jews with transcendent commitments on 
both sides of the culture wars.114 They have different understandings of the
demands of Judaism, the political and cultural threats it faces, and how best
to respond socially and politically. But those are mainly matters of concern 
for Jews, rather than for Christians or pagans. 
110. See Jonathan D. Sarna, Church-State Dilemmas of American Jews, in  JEWS 
AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE: DEBATING RELIGION AND REPUBLIC, supra note 91, at
47, 47–68; Noah Pickus, “Before I Built a Wall”—Jews, Religion and American Public 
Life, 15 THIS WORLD 28, 31 (1986); see also AMERICAN JEWS AND THE SEPARATIONIST FAITH:
THE NEW DEBATE ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 58 (collecting Jewish perspectives 
on separation of church and state). 
111. Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy Safe for
Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 499, 503 (1998). 
112. See Dalin, supra note 91, at 294–96; Jack Wertheimer, The Jewish Debate over
State Aid to Religious Schools, in JEWS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE: DEBATING 
RELIGION AND REPUBLIC, supra note 91, at 217, 223–28. 
113. See, e.g., DAVID NOVAK, THE JEWISH SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL
THEOLOGY chs. 7–8 (2005).
114. The same is true, of course, for many other religious denominations. See HUNTER, 
supra note 54, at 120–24. 
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
V. THE IDEA OF A JEWISH SOCIETY
Smith begins his book by asking a question that is familiar to Jews: Why 
do they hate us so much? The question, for Smith, is about why pagans 
persecute Christians, and the answer is that they have competing moral 
values, born of conflicting conceptions of normative authority.115  And so
Smith, following Eliot, argues that modern democratic societies face a
choice between incompatible moral traditions.  They can either renew, or 
perhaps recover, their Christianity, or they can continue the process of sliding 
into modern paganism.  Smith’s preference is clear: a Christian society is 
better than a pagan one, and, like Eliot, he hopes to persuade those with
transcendent religious beliefs by drawing out the contrasts between the 
two types of societies. 
Up to this point, we have followed Smith’s practice of generalizing and 
simplifying grand concepts like Christianity and paganism. Here we allow
ourselves one more such conceptual indulgence, despite our reservations
and ambivalence about the use of such categories. For Smith, a pagan 
society is one that recognizes and promotes immanent religious values.  
A Christian society, by contrast, is culturally aligned with transcendent
religion. But it should be clear that these are not the only alternatives. We 
can imagine a third type of society, one in which the public culture does not
demand that the state promote either immanent or transcendent religion. In
this society, citizens with a wide diversity of religious views, both immanent 
and transcendent, acknowledge the fact of their religious differences
and, to the extent possible, refrain from seeking state support for one
religious conception over the other.  In such a society, a person’s religious
identity, whether Christian or pagan, is irrelevant to that person’s rights
as a citizen, which are secured in virtue of a set of political and legal
institutions that do not presuppose a particular religious view. 
With a little chutzpah of our own, let us call the society we are describing 
here a Jewish society, not because it supports Judaism but because the Jew 
represents a religious minority who seeks political equality and religious 
freedom on fair terms with other religious believers, immanent or transcendent. 
The category of the Jew, in this conceptualization, is contrasted with
Eliot’s and Smith’s categories of the Christian and the pagan. Both Christians
and pagans want society to embody their religious values, and they would
prefer, if possible, for the state to reflect and support those values. In this
115. See SMITH, supra note 9, at 7–11. 
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way, as Eliot argued, society transforms a religious culture into politics 
and law.116 But, perhaps ironically, the Jew resists this ultimately theocratic
political conception. After two millennia of living in exile, persecution, 
and ghettoization, Jews have discovered a novelty in democratic political 
life. Without any hope to dominate politically, and with an eye toward
survival and an aspiration for political equality and social recognition, the 
Jews accept a moral ideal according to which the state is limited in its
purposes to promote goods that do not rest on any particular religious doctrine,
immanent or transcendent. Under this ideal, the exercise of political power
is justified, not by the ambitions of a triumphal or resurgent religious doctrine,
but by the reciprocal claims of citizens who conceive of themselves as free
and equal members of a democratic society. 
The “idea of a Jewish society” that we are describing is, of course, familiar
as a form of political liberalism, which can be understood as extending 
principles of religious toleration, disestablishment, and emancipation.117 
Our aim here is not to offer a defense of such a society,118 but rather to note
its possibility and its historical appeal for Jews and perhaps other religious 
minorities. 
We are aware of the irony of proposing the idea of a Jewish society in 
response to a schema that already offends by seeking to assimilate a vast
array of believers and nonbelievers into two religious groups—pagan and 
Christian—that are, as a social and psychological matter, likely unrecognizable
to most people. Moreover, we are aware that associating American Jewry
with liberalism feeds into the criticism that Jews are agents of secularism
or modern paganism.
We, of course, reject the identification of the Jew with “subversive” 
liberalism both because we reject the explicit anti-Semitism of that claim 
and because we reject the vilification of liberalism in any case.  More  
importantly, we think the claim of Jewish paganism is doubly mistaken.  
First, as we have argued above, it assumes incorrectly that liberal Jews— 
or liberal Catholics, Protestants, Mormons, Muslims, Hindus, etc.—lack
transcendent religious values, that they have no ethical or moral commitments
independent of their liberal political morality. And second, it assumes,
again incorrectly, that political liberalism is a form of paganism or immanent
religion. Smith makes this mistake when he argues that political liberals 
who favor an ideal of public reason would not exclude reasons drawn from 
an immanent religious conception, such as Ronald Dworkin’s conception 
116. See ELIOT, supra note 2, at 20–23. 
117. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1, 5 (1993). 
118. Though we are encouraged by the recent work of others. See generally CÉCILE 
LABORDE,LIBERALISM’S RELIGION(2017);JONATHANQUONG,LIBERALISM WITHOUTPERFECTION
(2011); NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017). 
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of “sacred” or “impersonal” values.119  But this view rests on a misunderstanding 
of liberal public reason, which is committed to public justification based 
on reasons that are, in principle, acceptable to citizens solely in virtue of
their status as free and equal members of a democratic society.120  To the
extent immanent religious values cannot serve as the basis for political
agreement among citizens with a diversity of transcendent and immanent
conceptions of the good, those values are not sufficient grounds for the
public justification of state action.121 
In a “Jewish society,” as we are conceiving it here, the state would be 
called upon to provide justifications for its treatment of citizens in terms
that do not rest on any particular religious tradition or doctrine. In this 
way, the state would maintain a core principle of separation and thereby
respect the equal citizenship of religious believers and nonbelievers, alike.  
A Jewish society would be one in which Christians and pagans (as Smith
understands those categories) and Jews (as we understand that category)
have equal standing as citizens, where the political culture and the state
that is responsive to it are not conceived primarily in terms of religious 
conflict but rather as fostering a system of fair social cooperation among
citizens with a diversity of religious views.
119. See SMITH, supra note 9, at 335. For Dworkin’s conception of “impersonal” 
values, which he argued could serve as the basis for justifying state action, see RONALD
DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 70– 
71 (2006); DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 130–31. 
120. For this idea of public reason, see generally JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public
Reason Revisited, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 573 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); 
Jonathan Quong, On the Idea of Public Reason, in A  COMPANION TO RAWLS 265 (Jon
Mandle & David A. Reidy eds., 2014); Micah Schwartzman, The Sincerity of Public Reason, 
19 J. POL. PHIL. 375 (2011).
121. Dworkin also criticized the idea of public reason, but in a sense, his objection
was the opposite of Smith’s. Dworkin’s concern was that public reason is too restrictive, 
that it would exclude some reasons that he thought ought to be permitted as grounds for 
public justification—reasons based on impersonal values.  See DWORKIN, supra note 119,
at 64–69. By contrast, Smith’s argument is, in part, that public reason is unfair because it would
permit reasons based on immanent or “impersonal” values, while excluding reasons that
appeal to transcendent sources. SMITH, supra note 9, at 334–35. In our view, both of these
criticisms are mistaken. Dworkin was confused about the idea of public reason and should
have accepted a version of it. See Micah Schwartzman, Religion, Equality, and Public Reason, 
94 B.U. L.REV. 1321, 1333–36 (2014) (arguing that given his moral commitments, Dworkin was
wrong to resist the idea of public reason). And Smith is mistaken for the reasons discussed
above. 
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The answer to Smith’s question—why do they hate us?—is that they feel
entitled to live in a society, and under the governance of a state, that 
represents their central religious commitments.  And “we”—whether
Christians, pagans, or Jews—pose a threat to the realization of that
entitlement.  And at least with respect to the Jews, the threat is real.  As Eliot 
understood, if you have enough “free-thinking” Jews in a society, they will
start to demand political recognition, civil rights, and eventually even equal 
treatment. They will argue that state power should be justified by public 
purposes, rather than the pursuit of religious ends. If they can build successful 
political coalitions, they will seek to secularize the state, to dismantle support 
for the majority or dominant religion, and to entrench the social and political
emancipation and equality of religious minorities. 
When Nazis and white supremacists marched through Charlottesville in 
August 2017, they shouted, “Jews will not replace us.”122 This anti-Semitic
slogan expresses the anxiety of cultural displacement and a profound sense 
of religious entitlement. White Christianity is the natural order, and how 
dare the Jews subvert it. A Jew in Charlottesville might be forgiven for thinking
of Eliot’s admonition about the need for racial and religious homogeneity 
to sustain a traditional Christian society. It is a profoundly ugly vision, one 
that we do not impute to Smith’s critique of modern paganism. But in erasing 
the concept of the Jew, in assimilating the Jew to Christianity or to paganism,
Smith leaves us wondering about the place of Jews—and of all religious
minorities, nonorthodox believers, and nonbelievers—in a Christian society.
The Jewish question is not why do they hate us—to which we know the
answers—but what will they do with us?  It is a question that Jews in this 
country have not had to ask for the last several generations, although others 
will certainly have asked it with respect to their own communities.  Any
proposal that raises the question anew, even one offered in good faith, is 
troubling and properly the subject of skepticism on the part of Jews and
other religious minorities. 
122. See Asher D. Biemann, “Vae Victis!”: Antisemitism as Self-Victimization (and 
What Spinoza Knew About It), in CHARLOTTESVILLE 2017: THE LEGACY OF RACE AND
INEQUITY 44, 52 (Louis P. Nelson & Claudrena N. Harold eds., 2018); Emma Green,
Why the Charlottesville Marchers Were Obsessed with Jews, ATLANTIC (Aug. 15, 2017).
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/nazis-racism-charlottesville/536928/
[https://perma.cc/DD98-CVEN].
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